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ALTERNATIVE TEST DECLARED FOR ATTACHMENT OF ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE TO THE CORPORATE CLIENT
Diverstied Industries, Inc. v. Meredith,
572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1978)
In Divers/fed Industries, Inc. v. Meredith' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the control group test 2 for deter-
mining the attachment of the attorney-client privilege to a corporate
client and declared an alternative standard based upon a modification
of the Harper & Row test.3
Weatherhead, an Ohio manufacturer, sued Diversified Industries,
Inc., its Missouri supplier, for allegedly bribing Weatherhead's
purchasing agents.4 Diversified sought to shield four documents from
discovery: a June 1975 memorandum instructing Diversified employees
to cooperate with the law firm of Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering (herein-
after referred to as Law Firm) in its investigation of Diversified's inter-
nal affairs;5 the report of that investigation; 6 corporate minutes
containing discussions of that report;7 and a subsequent memorandum
on the investigation.' Defendant based its objection to plaintiff's dis-
covery motion upon the attorney-client privilege and the work product
I. 572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc), rer'g on rehearing, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).
2. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.). mandamus
andprohtbition deniedsub nora. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963). The Westinghouse court announced the control group test for deter-
mining the application of the attorney-client privilege. This test limits the privilege to those cor-
porate employees who personify the corporation- ie., those who stand in a position to control or
take a substantial part in the actions advised by the corporate attorney, or who are authorized
members of the group that has the authority to control. 210 F. Supp. at 485.
3. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), afdb, an equally
divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971). The Harper & Row court rejected the control group test and
concluded that:
[An employee of a corporation, though not a member of its control group, is sufficiently
identified with the corporation so that his communication to the corporation's attorney is
privileged where the employee makes the communication at the direction of his superi-
ors in the corporation and where the subject matter upon which the attorney's advice is
sought by the corporation and dealt with in the communication is the performance by
the employee of the duties of his employment.
Id. at 491-92.
4. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 600 (8th Cir. 1977), rev'd on rehearing,
572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane).
5. 572 F.2d at 601.
6. Id. at 600-01.
7. Id. at 601.
8. Id.
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doctrine.9 The district court, however, ordered disclosure.' 0 On appli-
cation for mandamus, the Eighth Circuit upheld the trial court, " I hold-
ing that neither the attorney-client privilege nor the work product
doctrine afforded protection from discovery because the documents
represented the work of Law Firm as an investigator rather than as an
attorney.' 2 Granting a petition for rehearing en banc, the court re-
versed the panel's determination that Law Firm had functioned only as
an investigator and held- The attorney-client privilege extends to com-
munications of any corporate employee if the corporation establishes
that: (1) the communication was made for the purpose of securing legal
advice; (2) the employee making the communication to corporate coun-
sel did so at the behest of his corporate superior; (3) the superior's re-
quest was made to facilitate the corporation's securing of legal advice;
(4) the subject matter of the communication concerned the employee's
employment duties; and (5) dissemination of the communication was
restricted to only those who, because of the corporate structure, needed
to know its contents.' 3 Upon application of this test, the court found
that the privilege extended to all documents except the June 1975
memorandum. t4
The attorney-client privilege is a common law doctrine' 5 whose
9. Id. The United States Supreme Court announced the work product doctrine in Hickman
v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The Court held privileged reports, mental impressions, and other
writings prepared by an attorney in anticipation of litigation. Id. at 511. The work product doc-
trine is codified as FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). The distinction between the attorney-client privilege
and the work product doctrine is explained in Note, Attorne -Client Privilegefor Corporate Clients.
The Control Group Test, 84 HARV. L. REv. 424 (1970):
The attorney-client privilege poses an absolute bar to discovery from counsel no matter
how much the opposing litigant needs the information. It should thus be distinguished
from the work-product rule, which protects information gathered by an attorney in pre-
paring for litigation, but which can be defeated upon a showing of good cause.
Id. at 425-26.
10. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 599 (8th Cir. 1977), rev'don reheari,
572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane).
11. Id. at 603. The court also held that a writ of mandamus was an appropriate means for
appellate review. Id. at 599.
12. Id. at 603.
13. 572 F.2d at 609. The Divers/ied court's test represents an expanded version of the Harper
& Row test, which is discussed supra note 3.
14. Id. at 611.
15. Although the exact source of the privilege remains uncertain, it is believed to have
originated from the Roman law principle of loyalty between master and servant. See Radin, The
Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REv. 487 (1928).
Wigmore, in his discussion of the privilege's history, begins with the Elizabethan view that the
privilege attaches to the attorney, not the client. Justification for the privilege at this time rested
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modem justification rests upon the belief that it is in the best interests
of justice to encourage a client to make full disclosure to his attorney.' 6
Without the privilege's guarantee of confidentiality, which provides the
security necessary to encourage full communication,17 the flow and
upon the theory that it was "the oath and honor" of the attorney to preserve the secrets of his
clent. 8 J. WIOMORE EVIDENCE, § 2290, at 543 (rev. ed. J. McNaughton, 1961). Later courts,
influenced by eighteenth-century rationalism, rejected this justification, considering the privilege
an obstruction of justice. Id. For a discussion of the history and philosophy of the privilege see
Gardner, A Re-evaluation of the Attorne;-Client Privilege, 8 VILL. L. REV. 279 (1963).
16. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 15, § 2290, at 543; id. § 2291, at 545. Wigmore states: "In order
to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisers by clients, the apprehension of compelled
disclosure by the legal advisers must be removed; hence the law must prohibit such disclosure
except on the client's consent." Id. Annesley v. Earl of Angleesa, 17 How. St. Tr. 1129 (Ex. 1743),
presented the view that the privilege is an outgrowth of a modern industrial economy and con-
cluded that "[A]ll people and all courts have looked upon the confidence between the party and
attorney to be so great, that it would be destructive to all business if attornies [sic] were to disclose
the business of their clients." Id. at 1225.
See generalr Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 U S. (II Wheat.) 280 (1826) (privilege as general rule of
law): Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1972) (privilege as a fundamental tenet of the law
of evidence); Comercio E Indus. Continental, S.A. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 19 F.R.D. 513
S,D.N.XY. 1956) (privilege as requirement for effective functioning of counsel); Gardner, supra
note 15, at 292; Simon, The..tttornev-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953,
'954 (1956).
The societal importance of the attorney-client privilege is noted in MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
rule 210. Comment a (1942):
To induce clients to make such communications, the privilege to prevent their later dis-
closure is said by courts and commentators to be a necessity. The social good derived
from the proper performance of the functions of lawyers acting for their clients is be-
lieved to outweigh the harm that may come from the suppression of the evidence in
pecitfic cases.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
Another benefit resulting from full disclosure of the client to the attorney is increased compli-
ance with the law. Diversified Indus., Inc. v Meredith, 572 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc)
(criticizing the control group test for undermining this benefit), rev'g on rehearing, 572 F.2d 596
(8th Cir. 1977); Burnham, The Attorney-Client Privilegein the CorporateArena, 24 Bus. LAW. 901,
913-14 (1069); Miller, The Challenges to the .4ttorne,-Client Privilege, 49 VA. L. REV. 262, 268-69
(1963); Note, The Attorner-Client Privilege and the Corporation in Shareholder Litigation, 50 S.
CAL. L. REV. 303, 306 (1977).
Commentators note, however, that these justifications for the continued existence of the privi-
lege cannot be verified. See, e.g., Kobak, The Uneven Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to
Corporations in the Federal Courts, 6 GA. L. REV. 339, 339 (1972); Note, supra note 9, at 425. But
_%' Note, Functional Overlap Between the Lag'ver and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the
Privilged Communications Doctrine. 71 YALE LJ. 1226 (1962) (survey of attitudes concerning the
attorney-client privilege).
17. See United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915); Hunt v.
Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888). Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956); Lee Nat'l Corp. v. Deramus, 313 F. Supp. 224, 226 (D. Del.
1970), Grummons v. Zollinger, 240 F. Supp. 63, 67 (N.D. Ind. 1964), aff'd, 341 F.2d 464 (7th Cir.
1965): United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1970); McClure
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candor of communications would be impaired.' 8 The privilege belongs
to the client,' 9 protects the substance of his communication,2" and re-
quires consistent application because any departure from the rule
would seriously undermine its effectiveness in future attorney-client
relationships.2
Because the privilege prevents full disclosure to the parties, however,
it conflicts with the truth-seeking policy underlying the growth of mod-
em pretrial discovery.22 As a result, courts narrowly construe the doc-
v. Goodenough, 12 N.Y.S. 459, 460 (Sup. Ct. 1890); Note, The Atorney-ClIent Privilege. Fired
Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REv. 464, 469 (1977).
18. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961) (possibility of divulgence of
communications inhibits confidence required for effective legal representation); 8 J. WIGMOR .
supra note 15, § 2291, at 545 (privilege alleviates apprehension of compelled disclosures); MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 210, Comment a (1942) (complexity of social and legal structure renders
essential expert legal advice based upon the fullest freedom and honesty of communication); Note,
supra note 17, at 469; Note, supra note 9, at 426.
19. See Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 U.S. (II Wheat.) 280, 294 (1826) (attorney not competent to
testify concerning confidential communications made by his client); Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-
Warner Corp., 281 F.2d 551, 556 (2d Cir. 1967) (attorney duty bound to raise privilege in any
proceeding to protect confidential communications); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1970) (attorney-client privilege rule extended to client to prevent
disclosure of information given his attorney); Foster v. Hall, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 89, 96 (183 1)
(privilege of confidence is privilege of the client, not of the attorney); Minter v. Priest, 11930] A.C.
558 (same); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 15, § 2290, at 543; Comment, The Application in the Federal
Courts of the Attorney-Client Privilege to the Corporation, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 281, 282 (1970).
This principle is codified in PROPOSED FED. R. OF EvID. 503(c), 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969), which
provides that:
The privilege may be claimed by the client, his guardian or conservator, the personal
representative ... of a corporation, association, or other organization, whether or not in
existence. The person who was the lawyer at the time of the communication may claim
the privilege but only on behalf of the client. His authority to do so is presumed in the
absence of evidence to the contrary.
Id. at 250-51.
20. United States v. Kendrick, 331 F.2d 110, 113 (4th Cir. 1964), cited in Comment, supra
note 19, at 283 n. 13 (privilege extends to the subject matter of the communication as well as to the
existence of the communication).
21. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,403 (1976) (privilege exists to encourage clients
to make full disclosure to their attorneys thereby assuaging fear that damaging information will be
obtained by opponent from the attorney following disclosure, to counter client's reluctance to
confide in his lawyer, and to provide fully informed legal advice); Note, supra note 17, at 469.
22. Note, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege in the Federal Courts, 22 CATIl, LAW. 138,
139-40 n.6 (1976). Aware of the conflict between these two principles of privilege and discovery,
Wigmore commented that: "[The privilege's] benefits are all indirect and speculative; its obstruc-
tion is plain and concrete. . . . It is worth preserving for the sake of a general policy, but it is
nonetheless an obstacle to the investigation of the truth." 8 J. WIGORE, supra note 15, § 2291, at
554. Wigmore further urged that before the privilege is upheld there must be a finding that "the
injury that would inure to the [attorney-client] relation by the disclosure of the communications
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation." Id., § 2285,
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trine23 to apply to an individual client only upon a showing that: the
client sought legal advice; the communication did not concern prospec-
tive wrongdoing; a professional legal adviser, acting as such, gave the
advice; the communication was made in confidence; only the client
made the communication; and the client has not waived the privilege.
24
The applicability of the attorney-client privilege to the corporate cli-
ent went unquestioned 25 until 1962 when a federal district court, in Ra-
diant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Assn , 26 declared the privilege to be
a personal one that could be asserted only by natural persons.
27
at 527 (emphasis in original). See Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970) (class
action of stockholders against corporation and directors seeking recission of price paid for stock
on grounds of alleged violations of state and federal securities laws and common law fraud), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971). The Garner court, influenced by Wigmore's balancing principal,
decided that "the availability of the privilege [to a corporation when sued by its shareholders
,hould] be subject to the right of the stockholders to show cause why it should not be invoked in
the particular instance." 430 F.2d at 1103-04. See also Note, supra note 9, at 425-26.
23. This principle is well established by a number of cases. See. e.g., United States v. Gold-
farb, 328 F.2d 280, 282 (6th Cir. 1964) (privilege is exception and should be limited to its purpose);
Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Fielding, 343 F. Supp. 537, 546 (D. Nev. 1972) (privilege arises
only when attorney acts as independent legal adviser, not business adviser); In re Colton, 201 F.
Supp. 13, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (privilege upheld only if properly raised); United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950) (privilege strictly construed in accordance
with its object); Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 396, 364 P.2d 266, 288, 15
Cal. Rptr. 90, 112 (1961) (privilege suppresses relevant information); Sacramento Newspaper
Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors, 263 Cal. App. 2d 41, 58, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480, 492
(1968) (privilege bars public access to public affairs); Foster v. Hall, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 89, 97
(1831) (privilege prevents full disclosure of the truth), In re Richardson, 31 N.J. 391, 396-97, 157
A.2d 695, 698 (1960) (privilege is not absolute); 8 J. WIGMNORE, supra note 15, § 2291, at 554.
24. 8 J. WIGMORE, wpra note 17, § 2292, at 554. For a discussion of each aspect of the
definition see id. §§ 2294-2299 (legal advice sought), § 2298 (prohibition against protecting com-
munications of wrongdoing), 6§ 2300-2304 (advice by legal adviser acting in that capacity),
4§ 2311-2316 (confidentiality), §§ 2317-2320 (communication made by the client), §§ 2327-2329
(waiver)
25. E.g., United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318 (1915); A.B. Dick Co. v.
Marr, 95 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), afd, 197 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 878
(1952); 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, 503(b)[04], at 41 (1977). For a
complete listing of cases holding that the attorney-client privilege belongs to the corporate client,
Nee Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 319-20 n.7 (7th Cir. 1963). This
general acceptance of the right of the corporation to claim the privilege also seems well established
by a series of cases that concerned application of the privilege to in-house counsel. See Georgia-
Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Zenith Ra-
dio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954); Leonia Amusement Corp.
v. Loew's Inc., 13 F.R.D. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F.
Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950); Comment, supra note 19, at 287-88.
26. 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill), opinion supplemented, 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Ill. 1962),
re'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
27 Id. at 773.
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Though the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit quickly re-
versed,28 its ruling failed to resolve the fundamental problem inherent
in the corporate claim to the attorney-client privilege: the problem of
identifying the client. Because a corporation is not an individual but
an entity that speaks through its board of directors, agents, and em-
ployees, 29 the real question is who among this myriad of individuals is
the corporation.30 The federal courts developed three basic approaches
to the question.
Judge Campbell analogized the attorney-client privilege to the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion and cited Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911), and Essgee Co. v. United States, 262
U.S. 151 (1923), as authority for denying the corporation the right to the privilege against self-
incrimination. 270 F. Supp. at 773.
Aside from his concern about the personal nature of the attorney-client privilege, Judge Camp-
bell felt that a corporate privilege easily could be abused. 207 F. Supp. at 774. He recognized that
a grant of privilege to the corporation immediately raises the question of determining who the
client is when the corporation asserts the privilege. Noting that an individual is not able to claim
the privilege through an agent because, if so permitted, he could "increase the scope of the protec-
tion afforded to him" and "profane" the privilege, he reasoned that a corporation should not be
permitted to do what the individual client could not do. Id. The composition of boards of direc-
tors, in his opinion, supported this conclusion. Because boards are often composed of members
who serve simultaneously on several boards, it is unrealistic to assume that their communications
would be made with the intent of confidentiality and, even if so made, that disclosure could be
avoided. Failure to maintain confidentiality abuses the privilege and undermines one of the basic
tenets of the privilege's rationale. Id. Finally, Judge Campbell asserted that "where corporations
are involved, with their large numbers of agents, masses of documents and frequent dealing with
lawyers, the zone of silence grows large." Id. He concluded that the zone-of-silence approach
presented a potential means of insulating corporate activities and as such gave corporations an
advantage not held by the individual client. Id. at 775. See also America Cyanamid Co. v. Her-
cules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1962), in which the court, although disagreeing with
the Judge Campbell's decision, restated his concern. "This court [American C4ranainiaj does not
feel a corporation should be able to insulate vital facts by using the privilege in a perverting
manner." Id. at 88 n.12.
28. 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.). "A corporation is entitled to the same treatment as any other
'client'-no more and no less. If it seeks legal advice from an attorney, and in that relationship
confidentially communicates information relating to the advice sought, it may protect itself from
disclosure, absent its waiver thereof." Id. at 324. See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 263
(1964) ("A corporation, like any other 'client,' is entitled to the attorney-client privilege."). The
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence included corporation within its definition of client entitled to
assert the privilege: "A 'client' is a person, public officer, or corporation, association, or other
organization or entity, either public or private, who is rendered professional legal services by a
lawyer, or who consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal services from him."
PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 503(a)(1), 46 F.R.D. 161, 249-50 (1969).
29. See, e.g., DuplanCorp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1164 (D.S.C. 1975).
See also C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 88, at 178-79 (2d ed. 1972).
30. American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1962). The
court commented that "it is difficult, if not impossible to determine who speaks for the corpora-
tion." Id. at 88 n. 12. See also 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 25, 1 503(b)[04], at 38-40.
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Prior to Radiant Burners, the courts assumed the attorney-client priv-
ilege to protect the communications of all officers and employees of the
corporation 3 I United States n. United Shoe Machinery Corp.3" exem-
plified this approach. In the course of establishing a rule for determin-
ing the proper application of the privilege,33 Judge Wyzanski suggested
that the privilege extended to the communications of any corporate
personnel that had not been disclosed to the public.34 While the United
Shoe approach tended to promote the goal of full disclosure between
client and attorney and proved easy to administer,35 it conflicted with
dicta in Hickman v. Ta)'lor3" in which the Supreme Court indicated a
willingness to limit the scope of the privilege. 7
Thereafter, a second approach emerged in City of Philadelphia v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp."s Influenced by Hickman39 and mindful
of the warning in Radiant Burners4" that the corporate privilege invites
abuse,4 the City of Philadelphia court held that the privilege applies
only when the corporation seeks legal advice and only to communica-
31. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 25, 503(b)104], at 41.
32. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950); see 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 25,
503(b)[041, at 41.
33. The court held that the privilege applies only if:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to
whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his
subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the
communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b)
without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an
opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not
(d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a)
claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
89 F. Supp. at 358-59.
34. Id. at 359. United Shoe was followed in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America,
121 F. Supp. 792,794 (D. Del. 1954): see United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp.
251. 252 (N.D.N.Y. 1960).
35, 2 J. WEINSTEIN & NI. BERGER, supra note 25, 503(b)[041, at 41.
36, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
37. Id. at 508. The Court remarked that communications of corporate employees secured by
corporate counsel in anticipation of litigation were not privileged attorney-client communications
because the employees were eyewitnesses to the subject matter of the litigation. Id See 2 J.
WEIN.STEIN & hi. BERGER, supra note 25. f 503(b)[04]. The Court noted, however, that such
communications might fall within the work product doctrine subject to discovery only upon good
cause. 329 U.S. at 508. For a discussion of the work product doctrine, see note 9 supra.
38. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.). mandamus andprohibition deniedsub noma. General Elec. Co.
v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
39, 210 F. Supp. at 485.
40. See notes 25-28 supra and accompanying text.
4). 210 F. Supp. at 484; see note 27 supra.
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tions made by persons in a position to control or partake in the corpo-
ration's decision to act upon advice of counsel.42 For nearly a decade,
courts followed the "control group" test with little refinement or exami-
nation.43 Acceptance of the test appeared so uniform that the drafters
of the 1969 Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence considered it the con-
trolling standard.'
In 1970 the Seventh Circuit, in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. .
Decker,45 found the control group test inadequate. It adopted a stan-
dard that expanded the privilege's protection to the communications of
non-control group personnel who, at the request of their superiors,
made disclosure to corporate counsel concerning their duties as em-
ployees.46 The precedential value of Harper & Row remained unclear,
however, due to affirmance without opinion by an equally divided
Supreme Court.47
42. 210 F. Supp. at 485. In announcing this test, the court criticized Judge Wyzanski's broad
definition in United Shoe of those corporate employees who are entitled to the protection of the
privilege. Id; see notes 31-35 supra and accompanying text. The court also rejected tests based
upon an employee's rank or title since terminology varies among corporations. 210 F. Supp. at
485.
43. Kobak, supra note 16, at 363; see Rucker v. Wabash R.R., 418 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1969);
Virginia Elec. and Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397 (E.D. Va.
1975); Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117 (M.D. Pa. 1970); Congoleum Indus.,
Inc. v. GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Ortiz v. H.L.H. Products Co., 39 F.R.D. 41 (D.
Del. 1965); Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
44. Kobak, supra note 16 (citing PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 503(a)(3)), commented: "For pur-
poses of the attorney-client privilege Rule 503(a)(3) defines a 'representative of the client' as 'one
having authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant
thereto, on behalf of the client.'" Id. at 363-64. In 1971 the definition of the representative of the
client in terms of the control group approach came under attack. The drafters eliminated the
definition leaving the matter for a case-by-case resolution. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra
note 25, 503[01], at 11-13. See also ProposedRules of Evidence: Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the
Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Crim. Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciar, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 222-25 (1973) for a summary of this debate.
45. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), afT'd by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971). See
also D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 388 P.2d 700, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468
(1964) (when employee is required to communicate with counsel in ordinary course of business,
employee statement is that of employer for privilege purposes).
46. 423 F.2d at 591-92. The limitation to communications concerning an employee's duties
was designed to prevent a corporation's use of the privilege to shield communications of employ-
ees who fortuitously witness events that may create corporate liability. See Diversified Indus., Inc.
v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606,609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc); cf 423 F.2d at 491 (communications
at issue not in the nature of bystander witness accounts). Attorney interviews of employee/ by-
standers may be subject to the work product rule. 572 F.2d at 609 n.2; see notes 9 & 37 supra and
accompanying text.
47. Kobak, supra note 16, at 365.
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Of the three approaches, courts continue to favor the control group
test for its certainty and ease of application.4" The few courts espous-
ing the Harper & Row approach have largely failed to provide the
guidelines necessary to improve its usefulness.49 Still other courts ap-
ply various combinations of the control group and Harper & Row
tests,50 or proceed on a case-by-case basis.5 This "balkanization of
48. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606, 608 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (com-
menting that the control group test is the most widely used); Kobak, supra note 16, at 363 ("Until
recently. federal courts have slavishly followed the ruling in Westinghouse.").
See Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968) (test is whether a person has authority to
control, or substantially participate in, decision regarding action to be taken on advice of lawyer,
or is authorized member of group that has such power); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Ship-
building & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397, 400 (E.D. Va. 1975) ("the rule more easily applied by
the Court, the rule more easily understood by lawyers, the rule more likely to be recognized as
reasonable by the parties, and the rule most consonant with the purposes of the attorney-client
privilege is the control group test"); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 35-36 (D.
Md. 1974) (when corporation seeks to invoke privilege, communications must be between counsel
and corporation's control group); Honeywell Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117 (M.D. Pa.
1970) (corporation claiming privilege bears the burden of proving employees are control group
members); Congoleum Indus., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (privilege unavail-
able to employee member of study group lacking ultimate decisionmaking responsibility); Garri-
son v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (officers, directors, and
department heads considered members of corporate control group).
Some courts did not specifically apply the control group test, but indicated that the availability
of the attorney-client privilege to the corporation depends on the position in the corporation of the
employee making the communication. Rucker v. Wabash R.R., 418 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1969) (no
privilege since the employees were not of such rank as to qualify as representatives of the corpora-
tion); Leve v. General Motors Corp., 43 F.R.D. 508, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (privilege extends to a
communication by an executive); Ortiz v. H.L.H. Products Co., 39 F.R.D. 41 (D. Del. 1965) (no
privilege for communication by foreman).
49. See Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco-Gateway Corp., 62 F.R.D. 454, 456 (N.D. 111.
1974) (dissemination of communication between corporation lawyer and corporate employee to
employees directly concerned with such matters does not waive the privilege), affd without opin-
ion, 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976); Hasso v. Retail Credit Co., 58 F.R.D. 425, 428 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
(memorandum prepared by employee acting on instructions of branch manager defendant's in-
house counsel privileged); Rockwell Mfg. Co. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 57 F.R.D. 111, 113
(N.D. Ill. 1972) (letter prepared for patent counsel privileged); Panduit Corp. v. Burdy Corp.,
[1971] 172 U.S.P.O. (B.N.A.) 46, 47 (furnishing copies of communications to nonmembers of cor-
porate control group does not constitute waiver of privilege).
50. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken Inc., 397 F Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974); Dunn Chem.
Co. v. Syborn Corp., 1975-2 TRADE CAS. 60,561 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1975). Both these cases apply
a dual approach: the control group test and Harper & Row test. The Duplan court limited the
privilege, first, to communications to or from a member of the corporate control group or an
employee acting at the direction of a control group member, and second, to communications inci-
dent to a request for legal advice. 397 F. Supp. at 1163, 1165. The court further noted that the
"main consideration is whether the particular representative of the client, to whom or from whom
the communication is made, is involved in rendering information necessary to the decisionmaking
process concerning a problem on which legal advice is sought." Id. at 1165. In Perrignan v.
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[the] attorney-client privilege"52 undermines the very rationale upon
which the privilege rests-that the best interests of justice require that
the client feel free to communicate with counsel without fear of disclo-
sure, and that this guarantee demands certainty in application.5 3
The panel decision in Diersjfed Industries v. Meredith5 4 acknowl-
edged both the control group and Harper & Row tests, but found it
unnecessary to apply either. The court concluded that Law Firm had
acted as an investigator rather than as an attorney. Thus, Diversified
was not entitled to the privilege.55 In dissent Judge Heaney criticized
Bergen Brunswick Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455 (N.D. Cal. 1978), the court found statements privileged if
the employee was a control group member or if the employee made the communication at the
direction of superiors and the subject matter of the communications concerned the performance of
employment duties. Id. at 459. In Eutectic Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35, 40 (E.D.N.Y.
1973), the court considered determinative the nature and content of the communications, the ex-
tent of disclosure within the corporation, and the relationship of the employee to the communica-
tion and to the corporation. Still another formulation emerged in In re Ampicillin Antitrust
Litigation, 1978-1 TRADE CAS. % 62,043 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 1978), in which the court focused solely
on the communication and its relationship to the legal question leading the corporation to seek the
advice of counsel. See Mead Data Central, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (court found that the privilege did not apply to information shared with third
parties, but noted that the privilege extended to an agency's communications with its attorney);
Attorney-General of the United States v. Covington & Burling, 430 F. Supp. 1117 (D.D.C. 1977);
FTC v. Lukens Steel Co., 1977-1 TRADE CAS. 61,372 (D.D.C. Feb. 17, 1977). Both cases ac-
knowledged the split between the two tests.
51. Eutectic Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35, 40 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), see Radiant Burners,
Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1963).
52. Note, supra note 22, at 142.
53. See notes 16-21 supra and accompanying text. See also Note, supra note 9. at 426. In
support of the control group test the author commented:
If the privilege is to achieve its purpose of encouraging communications the communi-
cants must be able to discern at the stage of primary activity whether the communication
will be privileged. An ad hoc approach to privilege pursuant to a vague standard
achieves the worst of possible worlds: harm in the particular case because information
may be concealed; and a lack of compensating long-range benefits because persisting
uncertainty about the availability of the privilege will discourage some communications.
Id.
54. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977), rey'don rehearing, 572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
55. Id. at 603. The court commented:
We find it unnecessary to decide whether the persons interviewed by the Firm's repre-
sentatives should be considered as "clients" because we are persuaded that Law Firm
was not hired by Diversified to provide legal services or advice. It was employed solely
for the purpose of making an investigation of facts and to make business recommenda-
tions with respect to the future conduct of Diversified in such areas as the results of the
investigation might suggest. The work that Law Firm was employed to perform could
have been performed just as readily by non-lawyers aided to the extent necessary by a
firm of public accountants. Thus Diversified has failed to satisfy one of the requisites of
a successful claim of attorney-client privilege.
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this holding. 6 More importantly, he proposed a modification of the
Harper & Row test for applying the attorney-client privilege to corpo-
rations. 57 On rehearing en banc, the court adopted Judge Heaney's po-
sition on both the investigator-attorney issue and the modified Harper
& Row test.55
Now writing for the court, Judge Heaney acknowledged the predom-
inance of the control group test,5' but immediately cited its critics. 6° In
particular, he expressed concern that the test's restriction of the privi-
lege to personnel in a decisionmaking position in the corporation failed
to reflect the realities of corporate life.6' Limiting the privilege to com-
munications of top level executives could chill corporate counsel's ef-
56. Id. at 605 (Heaney, J., concurring and dissenting) (agreeing with the majority that man-
damus was a proper form of review and that Diversified had not waived its privilege by its surren-
der of certain documents to the SEC)
57, Id. at 606. Judge Heaney recommended that the control group test be rejected and re-
placed by the Harper & Row test with modifications suggested in 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
vupra note 25, 503(b)104], at 45-47 (1975). Judge Heaney viewed the following requirements as
e.sential: that the lawyer was acting as legal advisor when the communication was made, that the
subject matter be the performance by the employee of the duties of his employment, and that the
communication was not disseminated beyond those with a need to know. 572 F.2d at 606 (He-
aney, J., concurring and dissenting). see note 24 supra and accompanying text.
5& 572 F.2d at 609-10. The court upon rehearing left untouched the earlier holding on the
availabihty of mandamus as a means of appellate review and the rejection of extending the attor-
ney-client privilege to the June 1975 memorandum. Id. at 607; see 572 F.2d at 599, 603.
59, 572 F.2d at 608. The court cited Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397, 400 (D.C. Va. 1975). in which the court noted the major reasons for the
control group test's predominance: its ease of application, its narrowness of scope, its allowance
for wider discovery, and its general consonance with the purposes underlying the privilege. Id
See Note, supra note 9, at 426 (arguing that the value of the control group test lies in its establish-
ment of a "bright-line" test, which increases certainty and eases judicial administration). But see
Kobak, supra note 16, at 368-70 (criticizing the view that the control group test provides a bright-
line rule and questioning whether any test can provide such certainty when "so heterogeneous are
the contexts in which an attorney's services are sought that no objective test can replace the need
for thought and judgment." Id. at 308).
60, 572 F.2d at 608 (citing Kobak, supra note 16); Weinschel, Corporate Employee Interviews
and the 4ttorne;'-Client Privilege, 12 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. Rnv. 873 (1970); Note, Privileged
Communcations-Inroad on the "Control Group" Test in the Corporate Area, 22 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 759 (1971); Comment, supra note 19.
61 572 F.2d at 608; see Burnham, Confidentialir and the Corporate Lawyer, 56 ILL. B.J. 542
(1968), which comments that the Hestinghouse court in formulating the control group test:
seemed unwilling to think except in terms of individuals-the kind of individual client
who makes a privileged disclosure to his attorney and then, on the basis of the attorney's
legal advice, decides what action to take. The corporation. . . thus could have a privi-
lege only to the extent that particular individuals within the corporation possess all the
characteristics of the individual clients just described, making disclosures on the one
hand and then deciding. . . what action to take.
Id. at 54647: Note. supra note 60, at 761, See Comment, supra note 19, at 291.
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fort to obtain from middle management or nonmanagement personnel
information necessary to render competent legal advice.62 The control
group test, Judge Heaney concluded, discourages the very process of
full and frank disclosure the attorney-client privilege was designed to
promote.63
Finding the control group test inadequate, the court declared the
Harper & Row test to be a more reasonable and effective standard be-
cause its focus on subject matter, instead of on personnel, better ad-
vances the free flow of information to corporate counsel from all em-
ployees.64 As a result, the corporation would be encouraged to seek
legal advice before initiating potentially illegal practices, and the cor-
porate attorney would be better able to advise his client on such
practices.65
While declaring Harper & Row to be the better test, the court ac-
knowledged its inherent potential for abuse.66 Of major concern is the
possibility that corporations might begin to routinely funnel communi-
cations through their attorneys to facilitate subsequent claims to the
attorney-client privilege. 67 To thwart such schemes, the court adopted
an approach, suggested by Judge Weinstein,68 that would require cor-
porations claiming the privilege to prove: that the employee making the
communication did so at the request of his superior, that the subject
matter of the requested communication concerned the employment du-
ties of the employee, that the superior making the request did so for the
purpose of securing legal advice, and that the communication's confi-
dentiality was maintained to an extent consistent with both the nature
62. 572 F.2 at 608-09 (citing Weinschel, supra note 60, at 876). If counsel did seek commu-
nications from those outside of the control group, his revelation that their communications would
not be privileged would most likely lessen their willingness to cooperate.
63. Id. at 609. In addition, Judge Heaney believed that the absence of the privilege for those
outside the control group would deter corporate attempts at self-policing. Id But see Note, supra
note 9, at 425.
64. 572 F.2d at 609. The court commented: "The Harper & Row test provides a more rea-
soned approach to the problem by focusing upon why an attorney was consulted, rather than with
whom the attorney communicated" (emphasis added). Id.
65. Id.
66. Id (citing Note, supra note 60, at 766). See Note, supra note 9, at 426; note 27 supra. But
see Kobak, supra note 16, at 370-71 (arguing that "a more pliant approach" than the control
group test will not automatically lead to abuse, and stating further that if a corporation does
intend concealment, the control group test is as easy to circumvent as a less strict approach).
67. See, e.g., In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 1978-1 TRADE CAS. 9 62,043, at 74,511
(D.D.C. Mar. 20, 1978); 572 F.2d at 609; 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 25, 9
503(b)[04], at 44-45; Note, supra note 9, at 426; Note, supra note 60, at 776.
68. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 25, S 503(b)[03], at 45-47 (1975).
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of the corporate decisionmaking process and the rationale underpin-
ning the attorney-client privilege.69
Applying this test to the facts of the case, the court found that Diver-
sified, by virtue of its commission of the investigation to an attorney,
had made a prima facie showing of its intent to secure legal advice.7 °
In rather conclusory fashion the court also found that Diversified had
satisfied the other requirements of the modified Harper & Row test.7'
Accordingly, the court held privileged the report and all communica-
tions subsequent to it, leaving only the initial memorandum
unprotected.72
The dissenting judges accepted the modified Harper & Row test as
the appropriate standard for defining the corporate attorney-client
privilege, 73 but disagreed with the court's application of the test.74
69. 572 F.2d at 609; 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 25, 503(b)[04], at 45-47.
70. 572 F.2d at 610 (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 15, § 2296):
It is not easy to frame a definite test for distinguishing legal from nonlegal advice....
[T]he most that can be said by way of generalization is that a matter committed to a
professional legal advisor is prima iacie so committed for the sake of the legal advice
which may be more or less desirable for some aspect of the matter, and is therefore
within the privilege unless it clearly appears to be lacking in aspects requiring legal
advice.
Id. (emphasis in original).
71. 572 F.2d at 610-11. The court found that: the resolution authorizing the investigation
specifically instructed employees to cooperate with Law Firm; an examination of the report indi-
cated that Law Firm only asked employees for information that was within the scope of their
employment; and Diversified had maintained the requisite confidentiality. Id.
72. Id.
73. Judge Henley commented:
If I were able to accept the majority's premise that Diversified employed Law Firm as
its attorney to give it legal advice or to perform legal services, I would not, at least to a
point, have any trouble with the adoption of a modified Harper & Row test to be applied
in identifying corporate personnel whose communications would be considered as falling
within the attorney-client privilege ...
Id. at 613 (Henley, J. concurring and dissenting); Judge Gibson: "The majority opinion describes
the controversy that exists as to what communications, by which corporate agents are protected by
the attorney-client privilege. I am pleased to concur in Judge Heaney's analysis." Id. at 616
(Gibson, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Bright: "Although reluctant to express an opinion
on the merits because of my view that the controversy is moot, I agree in the main with the
dissenting views of Judge Henley." 1d. at 617 (Bright, J., dissenting).
74. Judge Henley, agreeing with the panel decision, see notes 61-62 supra and accompanying
text, argued that Law Firm had not acted as a legal adviser, but as an investigator. 572 F.2d at
614 (Henley, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Gibson felt that Diversified had waived its
privilege, as it applied to parts of the 1975 report, by incorporating them into the minutes of
several board meetings. Because shareholders have common law and statutory rights to discover
those minutes, they lacked the requisite confidentiality. Id. at 616-17 (Gibson, J., concurring and
dissenting). Judge Bright, who felt the controversy was moot because Weatherhead had obtained
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Judge Henley criticized the majority's presumption that Diversified, by
its commission of the investigation to Law Firm, had made a prima
facie showing of intent to secure legal advice. He argued that such a
presumption placed an insurmountable burden on the party seeking
discovery75 and disagreed with the court's finding that Law Firm's in-
vestigation represented legal work.76
With its modifications of the Harper & Row test, the Diversified court
hoped to provide an alternative preferable to both the control group
and Harper & Row tests. Compared to the United Shoe, the control
group, and the Harper & Row tests, the Divers/ifed approach is more
realistic in its recognition of the legal needs of the corporation and the
role of the corporate attorney.77 The Diversifled test also more effec-
tively balances the corporation's need for confidential disclosure to
counsel with the plaintiff's need for discovery.7 Whether the Diversi-
fied test will be able to effectuate its objectives, however, is open to
question for two reasons.
First, the court's application of the test appears inconsistent with the
reasoning that guided its formulation. To prevent abuse of the privi-
lege, the court placed on the corporation asserting the privilege the bur-
den of demonstrating the various elements of the test. Assignment of
this burden to the claimant corporation is clearly justified because, be-
the information it sought from Diversified's involuntary disclosures to SEC, agreed with Judge
Henley on the merits. Id. at 617 (Bright, J., dissenting).
75. 572 F.2d at 614 (Henley, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Henley indicated that he
did not think Dean Wigmore meant to place the burden on the party seeking disclosure in every
instance where a matter is entrusted to a lawyer.
The difficulty is that, at least in many instances, the party seeking disclosure does not
know in advance and has no way of knowing why the matter in question was turned over
to the lawyer, or why the communications were developed, or what they amounted to or
contained. Thus, apart from in camera proceedings, such as the one that was had in this
case, there is no way for the party seeking disclosure to meet the prima facie case of
privilege mentioned by Wigmore.
Id.
76. Id. at 614-16. Judge Henley based his conclusion upon the material that Judge Meredith,
the district court judge, considered in camera. Id. at 614.
77. Id. at 609; Note, The .4ttorney-Client Privilege and the Corporation in Shareholder Litiga-
tion, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 309 (1977) (greater access to counsel resulting from expanded availa-
bility of the privilege increases corporate compliance with the law).
78. See 572 F.2d at 608-09; notes 16-23 supra and accompanying text. The court in Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d at 321 (citing 56 Nw. U. L. REv. 235, 241 (1961)),
commented that "since the privilege does not exist out of deference to any personal right, but
rather because of policy considerations designed to facilitate the workings of justice, it is fully
applicable in the broad sense to corporations." See Note, supra note 77, at 308 n.29.
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tween the two parties, the corporation has superior access to the evi-
dence relevant to the claim. 9 The court, however, counteracted its
proposed safeguard against abuse by allowing a corporation to meet its
burden through a prima facie showing that the matter was committed
to an attorney. A corporation could easily meet this burden without a
showing of any actual intent to seek legal advice by merely channeling
its office memos through corporate counsel. The person seeking dis-
covery would then have to ferret out and prove a clear absence of such
intent, a burden that rarely could be met."0 While nominally shifting to
the corporation the burden of proving the availability of the privilege,
the court failed to shift the burden in fact.81
Second, critical to any test of attorney-client privilege is the existence
of a fixed standard upon which corporations and corporate counsel can
rely.8 12 Whether the Diverspied test provides the necessary certainty is
questionable in light of its treatment by subsequent courts. In SEC v.
Dresser Industries, Inc.," the court cited Divers/fed for the proposition
that a corporation claiming the privilege must prove that the communi-
cation was made for the purpose of securing legal advice. Finding
Dresser's claim to the privilege "vague and conclusory," the court re-
jected it without considering the other elements of the Diversifled test.8 4
In SEC v. Canadian Javelin,5 the court, while recognizing the Diversi-
lied test as an extension of Harper & Row, found it unnecessary to ap-
ply either test because the employee was not acting as an agent of the
corporation in his communications with counsel.8 6 The District Court
79. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
80. Id.
S. Aside from the problems previously mentioned in regard to the court's adoption of Wig-
more's prima facie test, it should also be noted that the test was formulated primarily with individ-
uals, not corporations, in mind. See 8 1. WiGMORE. supra note 15, § 2296, at 567 n.2 (listing cases
supporting the test's formulation). Furthermore, the test was formulated at a time when the legal
community generally assumed under United Shoe, Nee notes 31-35 supra and accompanying text,
that the privilege applied to all employees of the corporation. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771, 774-75 (N.D. Ill.), opinion supplemented, 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D.
Ill. 1962). rer'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.). cert denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963). By removing Wigmore's
test from its simple context and applying it without the careful analysis characteristic of the re-
mainder of the opinion, the court unravelled its carefully woven fabric.
82. 572 F.2d at 608-09.
83. 453 F. Supp. 573 (D.D.C. 1978).
84. Id. at 576.
85. 451 F. Supp, 594 (D.D.C. 1978).
8 6. Id. at 597-98.
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for the District of Columbia in In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 7
after describing Divers/fed as a rejection of both the control group and
Harper & Row tests,88 declined to follow the Divers/fled approach and
proposed its own test.8
9
The Divers/ed court, therefore, not only failed to effectively balance
the need for confidentiality in the attorney-client relationship with the
need for disclosure of relevant evidence, but further added confusion to
an area of law already lacking clarity.
87. 1978-1 TRADe CAS. T 62,043 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 1978).
88. Id. at 74,510.
89. The Ampicillin test requires that:
(I) The particular employee or representative of the corporation must have made a
communication of information which was reasonably believed to be necessary to the deci.
sion-makingprocess concerning a problem on which legal advice was sought;
(2) The communication must have been made for the purpose of securing legal
advice;
(3) The subject matter of the communication to or from an employee must have been
related to the performance by the employee of the duties of his employment; and
(4) The communication must have been a confidential one....
Id. at 74,510-11 (emphasis in original).
The Amfpicillin court considered its test "more limited [than the Diversed test] in that it re-
quires a close relationship between the communication and a decision on the legal problem (or at
least a reasonable belief of such a relationship) rather than a request by a superior to an employee
that the communication be made." Id. at 74,510 n.6a. On close analysis, this may be a distinction
without a difference. The pertinent elements of the Diversied and Ampicillin tests both aim at
insuring that the communication was made for the purpose of securing legal advice.
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